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THE TERRORIST EXPATRIATION ACT:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND UNNECESSARY. HOW
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND REDUNDANT
LAUREN PRUNTY*
INTRODUCTION
In October of 2010, Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized American citizen,
was arrested and indicted for his role in what he believed was an al-Qaeda
supported plan to bomb the Washington, D.C. metro.1 A few weeks earlier,
a group of Minnesotans, including middle-aged and elderly women, were
arrested for collecting door-to-door donations for charities providing food
and humanitarian aid to the people of impoverished, war-torn Somalia. 2 In
both of these instances, the involved parties were charged with "providing
material support to terrorists." 3
Few Americans would disagree with the terrorism charges brought in
response to the reprehensible and deliberate actions of Farooque Ahmed, or
* Lauren Prunty is a 2007 graduate of Villanova University, where she received a BA in political
science and a minor in business. She graduated from St. John's University School of Law in 2012 and is
currently an associate with the professional liability group at Mendes and Mount in New York.
I Alicia A. Caldwell, Va. Man Charged in Fake Bomb Plot Against Metro, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/27/fbi-arrests-va-man-plot-bomb-
dc-metro-stations/. Farooque Ahmed, a Pakistani born naturalized citizen provided information to
undercover federal agents posing as al-Qaeda operatives. He was indicted on charges of attempting to
provide material support to a designated terrorist organization, collecting information to assist in
planning a terrorist attack on a transit facility, and attempting to provide material support to carry out
multiple bombings to cause mass causalities at a Washington-area Metro station.
2 Kavitha Rajagopalan, Charitable donation or material support for terrorism?, PBS.org (Aug. 18,
2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/voices/charitable-donation-or-material-support-for-
terrorism/2905/. In August 2010, 14 people from a Somali community in Minnesota were charged with
channeling funds to a militant Somali group, Al Shabab. Al Shabab, like many other groups labeled
"terrorist organizations" by the U.S. Department of Justice, carries on extensive humanitarian and
community development programs in their impoverished nations.
3 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006). "The term 'material support or resources' means any property,
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe-houses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel
(one or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or
religious materials."
1009
1010 JOURNALOFCIVLRIGf7S&ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol.26:4
Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square Bomber. 4 However, the current anti-
terrorism statutes5 provide a broad definition of the term "material
support," 6 allowing individuals who have acted innocently or unknowingly
to be subject to the same repercussions as these men. 7 Under current law,
these charges are prosecuted in Federal district court and may result in a
sentence of life in prison. 8 As American citizens, suspects are given the
rights and protections of due process as guaranteed under the Constitution.
In May of 2010, Senators Joe Lieberman and Scott Brown proposed an
addition to the current expatriation statute, 9 making the provision of
"material support or resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization" an
action for which a U.S. citizen may lose his or her citizenship.o The
proposed amendment relies on the same broad definition of "material
support" found in the anti-terrorism statutes. 1 Furthermore, the provision
falls among a list of actions for which a citizen may be stripped of his or
her citizenship without the safeguards of pre-conviction due process.12
Subsection (a)(7) of the Expatriation Act lists treason as grounds for
citizenship revocation, "if and when he is convicted thereof by a court
martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction."l 3 Unlike the other actions
listed in the statute, treason is a criminal offense requiring conviction and
requisite due process protections.14 Treason, as defined in the United States
Code,15 involves the rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the
United States, or otherwise "engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put
down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to
levy war against them."l 6
4 See William K. Rashbaum et al., US. Arrests S. U V. Owner in Times Square Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 4,2010, at Al.
5 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
6 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
7 Rajagopalan, supra note 2. "We may not know the true nature of these and the remaining 12
indictees' intentions and activities for some time to come, but these indictments, and the not guilty pleas
of these two women, once against shine a bright light on how we define and prosecute terrorism."
8 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
9 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006).
10 Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237, 111th Cong. (2010).
11 Id. at §(2)(c)(3); see generally U.S.C § 2339A(b)(1).
12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (stating that in any action challenging a loss of citizenship, the burden
falls upon the party who claims such loss has occurred and must prove their claim by a preponderance
of the evidence. Furthermore, such party must rebut the presumption, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the action in question was performed voluntarily). See also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252 (1980); infra p. 20.
13 8. U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(7).
14 See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950). "Treason alone of crimes is
defined in the Constitution."
15 18 U.S.C. §2383-86 (2006).
16 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7).
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Loss of citizenship is a serious and extreme punishment. 17 The idea that
such a finite and harsh punishment may be imposed upon a U.S. citizen
based upon a broad and vaguely worded statute without the protection of a
trial and conviction goes against everything this nation stands for. Part I of
the Note provides the history and background surrounding both
expatriation and treason. Part II of the Note discusses the problems with the
broad language of the "material support" definition found in the anti-
terrorism statutes.18 Part III will discuss the proposed legislation, its
inherent constitutional problems, and its invalidity. Finally, Part IV will
discuss a proposal that punishment for those suspected of providing
material support to terrorists can be achieved by recognizing terrorism as
modem day treason, ultimately allowing for the revocation of citizenship
under the statute as it currently stands.19
I. THE EVOLUTION OF EXPATRIATION: FROM A PROTECTED RIGHT OF
CITIZENSHIP TO A FINITE AND SEVERE PUNISHMENT
A. The Natural and Inherent Right ofExpatriation
Expatriation is defined as "the voluntary relinquishment of nationality
and allegiance." 20 Beginning in 1868, Congress statutorily recognized a
citizen's "natural and inherent right" to voluntarily relinquish citizenship. 21
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of expatriation began to
evolve towards its contemporary meaning as Congress shifted from
recognizing expatriation as a constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, to a punishment for certain acts. 22 In the past one hundred
years, expatriation legislation has generally fallen within three different
objectives: 1) to create a formal procedure to exercise the right of
expatriation; 23 2) to reduce the number of dual nationals among United
17 Contra Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266 (1980). "[E]xpatriation proceedings are civil in
nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty."
18 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2006).
19 8 U.S.C. § 1481.
20 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CiviL. LIBERTIES 562 (Paul Finkelman, ed., 2004).
21 Stephan F. Pollak, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1171 (1955). "The Act of
1868 declared the willingness of the United States to permit its nationals to renounce American
citizenship, and served notice that it would unalterably oppose governmental interference with any
individual's right to change his nationality." See also Edwin M. Borchard, Decadence of the American
Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 312, 313 (1931).
22 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1171. "Beginning in 1907 with the first expatriation statute and
continuing to date, voluntary expatriation has taken on a markedly different meaning."
23 There is only one such statute enacted to primarily implement this right. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6)
provides for formal renunciation of citizenship, in writing, before an appropriate officer of the United
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Sates citizens; and 3) to punish American citizens who engage in criminal
activities and thereby to enforce the federal criminal law.24
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants the
right of citizenship to individuals born or naturalized in the United States. 25
However, no provision of the Constitution authorizes Congress to deprive
an individual of United States citizenship. 26 Early Supreme Court decisions
narrowly construed the Constitutional grant of nationalization and therefore
denied Congress the power to provide for denationalization of citizens. 27
As noted above, by the late nineteenth century, Congressional acquiescence
of an individual's inherent right to denounce citizenship prevailed,28 and
the Court eventually justified such action on the grounds of inherent
powers of sovereignty. 29
As the nature and purpose of the expatriation statutes began to change,
so did the meaning of the term "voluntary." While the "natural and
inherent" right of an individual to renounce one's citizenship 30 is indeed
voluntary in every sense of the word,31 not all instances of expatriation are
as clear. For example, "Congress declared that the voluntary performance
of certain acts by dual nationals would result in expatriation ....
Performance of such acts indicated that the individual had elected to
perform duties of citizenship for the State of his foreign allegiance." 32
Congress recognized that by requiring deliberate renunciation, few
individuals would choose to relinquish their United States citizenship when
they could instead retain the double benefits and protections of dual
citizenship.33 Therefore, Congress dispensed with the subjective intent
States, during a time of war.
24 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1172; Shai Lavi, Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the
Modern Duties of Citizens and Their Criminal Breach, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 783, 788-89 (2011).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . ."
26 John P. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality - The Development of Statutory Expatriation,
99 U. PA. L. REv. 25,26 (1950).
27 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 827 (1824) ("The simple power of the
national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power
exhausts it, so far as respects the individual."); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
703 (1898) ("The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer
citizenship, not a power to take it away.").
28 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1171. "Motivated by the desire to free recently naturalized Americans
from claims to allegiance advanced by states from which they had emigrated, Congress in 1868
recognized voluntary expatriation as a 'natural and inherent right of all people."'
29 Id. at 1176-77; Roche, supra note 26, at 27. "[Ut was constitutional for Congress to pass statutes
regulating nationality, for without this power the United States would not be fully sovereign."
30 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1171.
31 Id.atll73.
32 Id. at 1174.
33 Id at 1175.
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element of voluntariness, deciding instead that an objective standard of
intent would satisfy the voluntary requirement of expatriation. 34
In 1915, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the objective intent
standard when an American woman lost her citizenship, pursuant to statute,
upon marrying a British man.35 In Mackenzie v. Hare,36 Mrs. Mackenzie
alleged that Congress had no power to withdraw her citizenship without her
concurrence, and that she had never intended or desired to renounce her
citizenship. 37 The Court concluded that that Mrs. Mackenzie's marriage
was "a condition voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences,"
and the legislation under attack was therefore constitutional.38 This case,
although later distinguished on the grounds that it dealt exclusively with
dual nationals, 39 represents the beginning of the Court's acceptance of a
diminished standard of voluntariness.
Perhaps most importantly, while upholding the expatriation statute at
issue in Mackenzie, Congress also recognized the statute as a tool for
accomplishing foreign policy objectives.40 In this instance, the foreign
policy that Congress was looking to influence involved a problem of that
time regarding dual nationals. The Court stated that the statute "has
purpose, if not necessity, in purely domestic policy; it has greater purpose
and, it may be, necessity, in international policy." 41 Essentially, Congress
recognized that the statute in question was not enacted solely to facilitate
the voluntary expatriation of individuals, but perhaps more importantly, to
carry out important foreign policy objectives. 42
34 Id.
35 Expatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 59-193, §3, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) ("That any American woman
who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband.").
36 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
37 Id. at 306-07; Pollak, supra note 21 at 1176.
38 Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 312.
39 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1177. "Dual nationals have been a perennial source of international
friction, and their nationality is itself the cause of the difficulty. For Congress to forbid dual national to
perform acts which would tend to breed external problems, on pain of deprivation of nationality, or to
impose loss of nationality when a second citizenship is acquired, seems neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable." David Fitzgerald, A Tribute to the Work of Kim Barry: The Construction of Citizenship
in an Emigration Context: Symposium: Rethinking Emigrant Citizenship, 81. N.Y.U. L. REV. 90, 95
(2006).
40 Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311-12; Pollak, supra note 21, at 1176. "[In the expatriation legislation
considered in Mackenzie, Congress was not merely facilitating exercise of the citizen's right to
renounce citizenship voluntarily. It was using its power over foreign affairs to accomplish an
affirmative policy purpose."
41 Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311.
42 Id at 312. "But there is involved more than personal considerations. As we have seen, the
legislation was urged by conditions of national moment. . . . [T]his is no arbitrary exercise of
government. It is one which, regarding the international aspects, judicial opinion has taken for granted
would not only be valid but demanded."
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Finally, in the 1940's Congress began passing legislation 43 that used
expatriation as a means to neither facilitate a constitutional right nor
address the issue of dual citizenship- but rather as punishment for a
crime. 44 Over the next fifteen years, Congress compiled a list of crimes for
which a citizen may face expatriation as punishment. These acts, which
include treason, desertion in the time of war, rebellion, insurrection and the
like, required conviction by court martial or other "court of competent
jurisdiction," before an individual is relieved of their citizenship. 45
Although these statutes retain the language of the voluntariness
requirement, it is clear they can no longer hide behind the shield of
constitutional right as a rationale for legislatively prescribed citizenship
revocation.46
The notion of expatriation as punishment has raised several
constitutional questions. By enacting expatriation statutes for penal
purposes, 47 Congress must act in accordance with the constitutional
provisions applicable to penal legislation. 48 Therefore, in order for the
statutes to be constitutionally valid, the imposition of denationalization
may only be imposed after due process and conviction.49 When used as a
punishment, any question of voluntariness was essentially moot.50 "By
carrying the concept of voluntary to final meaninglessness, the Expatriation
Act of 1954 makes it virtually certain that the courts will at last disregard it,
turn afresh to the Constitution itself and make the new analysis for which
penal expatriation seems to call."51
43 Act of Sept. 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-431, 58 Stat. 746 (1944); 8 U.S.C. § 1481.
44 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1178-79; Consuelo A. Vasquez, Prometheus Rebound By the
Devolving Standards ofDecency: The Resurrection of the Chain Gang, 11 ST. JoHN's J. L. COMM. 221,
251 (1995).
45 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1179.
46 Id.
47 The congressional debates on the amendment to the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 78-
431, 58 Stat. 746 (1944), which made draft avoidance an expatriating act, indicate that Congress was
intent on punishment and deterrence at that time also. 90 CONG. REC. 7629 (1944); Recent Decisions,
61 Mich. L. Rev. 1561, 1561 (1963).
48 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1182 ("[A] determination that expatriation is a penal sanction would
bring into operation the constitutional protections afforded by the fourth, fifth, sixth and eight
amendments.").
49 Id. at 1182 n. 98.
50 Id. at 1179 ("To apply the label 'voluntary incarceration' to the imprisonment which follows
conviction of a subversive crime would not alter its nature as a criminal punishment. 'Voluntary
expatriation' is an equally inappropriate label for the loss of nationality which now results from the
same conviction.").
51 Id.at I182.
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B. Modern Expatriation: Focus on Intent
Today, expatriation is codified in Title 8 of the United States Code, at §
1481.52 The statute, originally passed in 1952, embraces the evolvement of
expatriation from a constitutional right to a form of punishment, reflecting
many of the aspects and considerations discussed above. However, in the
half century following the original enactment, the statute has undergone
significant amendments. In 1961, subsection (c)53 was added, providing for
a statutory presumption of voluntariness for any act of expatriation
committed under the statute. 54 In 1980, the Supreme Court heard a
challenge to this provision in Vance v. Terrazas.55 In that case, a Mexican
dual national contested his denaturalization on due process grounds. 56 The
Court upheld the provision, but stated that under the Court's previous
rulings 57 it would be inconsistent to treat the expatriating acts in § 1481(a)
as conclusive evidence of the voluntary assent of the citizen. 58 Therefore,
the Court reiterated their holding that the commission of an expatriating act
must be accompanied by the intent to terminate United States citizenship. 59
This holding was eventually reflected in a 1986 amendment to 8 U.S.C. §
1481(a), which added to the introductory clause, providing that "voluntarily
performing any of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing
United States nationality" 60 shall result in a loss of nationality.
Following the 1986 amendment, the courts struggled with the question of
intent. Some courts found that specific intent only required an individual to
have knowledge that loss of citizenship was likely to result from the
52 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006).
53 Currently § 1481(b).
54 Id.
55 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
56 Id. at 254. Appellee Terrazas lost his citizenship pursuant to § 148 1(a)(2), which provides that "a
person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by ... taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof." § 1481(c) provides that the party claiming the loss of
citizenship must establish a claim by a preponderance of the evidence that the voluntariness of the
expatriating conduct is rebuttably presumed.
57 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that a citizen has a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless such citizenship is voluntarily relinquished).
58 Vance, 444 U.S. at 261.
59 Id. at 263 ("As we have said, Afroyim requires that the record support a finding that the
expatriating act was accompanied by an intent to terminate United States citizenship"); see also
Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1420 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress is without
power to provide that citizens lose their citizenship by mere performance of specified acts; a person
loses citizenship if he voluntarily performs an expatriating act enumerated by Congress if, in
performing the act, he intends to relinquish citizenship).
60 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2006).
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commission of an expatriating act. 61 Other courts examined the intent
requirement subjectively, looking at all the facts and circumstances
surrounding an individual's alleged relinquishment of nationality. In
Parness v. Shultz,62 the D.C. District Court found that the government
failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that a naturalized Israeli
citizen specifically intended to relinquish his United States citizenship,
despite his desire to become an Israeli citizen. The court stated that
although the individual failed to investigate all of the options and
regulations regarding dual citizenship, he never intended to renounce his
U.S. citizenship. 63
Although the Supreme Court's failure to define the intent requirement
has left district courts with a variety of inconsistent precedent, 64 the
Department of State has attempted to clarify expatriation procedures by
emphasizing the importance of individual intent.65 They have stated that
intent may not be presumed from the performance of specific acts, but
rather determined by the well-developed and specific facts of each case.66
In light of the fundamental importance placed on U.S. citizenship, courts
should undertake extensive inquiry, consistent with the State Department's
approach, into the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged acts of
expatriation, as well as the thought processes of the individual, in order to
determine subjective intent.67
C. Treason: The Only Constitutional Crime
In its current form, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7) lists treason as an action for
which a citizen may be expatriated. 68 Treason, listed under Title 18 of the
61 Steven S. Goodman, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent Requirement in
Expatriation Proceedings, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 341 (1988); Richards, 752 F.2d at 1420.
62 669 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1987).
63 Id. at 10; see also Kahane v. Shultz, 653 F. Supp. 1486, 1494 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a
U.S. citizen with dual citizenship in Israel did not intend to relinquish his U.S. citizenship when he
committed the expatriating act of accepting a seat in the Israeli Knesset. His actions and statements
emphasized beyond doubt that the individual wanted to remain an American citizen, manifesting such
intent both before and after he joined the Israeli parliament).
6 Goodman, supra note 61, at 372; see Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 258-63.
65 Goodman, supra note 61, at 371; Department of State Airgram on Loss of Nationality Policy and
Procedures (Aug. 27, 1987), reprinted in 5 Fed. Immigration IJ Rep. (WSB) 17,523, at 12-45 to -48.
66 Goodman, supra note 61, at 351 ("This individualized inquiry focuses on the citizen's intent and
recognizes that indications of intent to relinquish citizenship may not be explicit or may be mixed with
indications of intent to retain citizenship."); Department of State Airgram, supra note 65.
67 Goodman, supra note 61, at 366 ("In light of the importance of citizenship, the govemment's
burden should not be eviscerated by the use of an objective standard of intent.").
68 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7) ("[C]ommitting any act of treason against, or attempting by force to
overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, violating or conspiring to violate any of the
provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 2383], or willfully performing any act in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2385], or
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United States Code,69 is the only crime explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution. 70 Treason has a long and significant history in American law.
The American Revolution itself, fresh in the mind of the founding fathers
upon the drafting of the Constitution, was an act of treason against Great
Britain. American legal tradition has long viewed treason as a serious
crime, deserving of the utmost punishment. 71
Despite the fact that expatriation proceedings themselves are "civil in
nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty," 72 treason is a criminal offense
for which conviction and the requisite due process is required. Therefore,
Section (a)(7) includes language not present in the preceding clauses: the
requirement that citizenship may only be lost upon conviction of such
expatriating act.73 Congress and the Supreme Court do not consider the loss
of citizenship to be a criminal sanction, loss of liberty or any such penalty
that would require conviction prior to imposition. However, in the instance
of a specific criminal action, such as treason, the due process requirement
of conviction cannot be superseded.
Over time, treason laws have evolved with the changing notions of war
and perceptions of enemies. Under the earliest treason statutes in the late
eighteenth century, violations primarily involved armed insurrections and
attempts to prevent federal enforcement of tax laws.74 During the Civil War
era, the government unsuccessfully attempted to apply treason laws to
abolitionists who forcibly liberated a slave from government custody. 75
World War II gave rise to treason cases involving espionage, enemy agents
violating [18 U.S.C. § 2384] of said title by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to
destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, if and when he is
convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
69 Title 18 of the United States Code deals exclusively with criminal statutes.
70 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession
in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder
of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted."). See also, Melysa H. Sperber, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the
Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for American Nationals Captured Abroad While Fighting
with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 191 (2003) ("The Constitution defines only one crime--
treason--indicating that the framers devoted significant attention to crafting its parameters, specifying
its scope and delineating the exact circumstances under which it could be proved.").
71 1 Stat. 112 (1790) c IX § 1 (providing for punishment of treason by death).
72 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266 (1980).
73 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7)(2006).
74 Richard Z. Steinhaus, Treason, A Brief History with Some Modern Applications, 22 BROOK. L.
REV. 254, 258 (1956).
75 Id. at 259-60. The court ruled that a treason charge was unsustainable absent a preconceived plan
formulated during a time of war.
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and saboteurs.76 In recent times, treason prosecutions have become
increasingly rare. This decrease is often attributed to the Supreme Court's
1945 opinion in Cramer v. United States,77 which has been largely
criticized as "cast[ing] such a net of ambiguous limitations about the crime
of 'treason' that it is doubtful whether a careful prosecutor will ever again
chance an indictment under that head."78
II. MATERIAL SUPPORT: LOOSELY DEFINED AND STRICTLY PUNISHED
"Material support" is an ambiguous term on its face. Taking the plain
language of the two words separately, it would appear to mean something
that is of substantial import or consequence and provides a basis for
existence or subsistence. 79 As evidenced from the basic dictionary
definition, the term is open-ended and gives no indication of the specificity
or breadth of its reach. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A describes the criminal action of
providing material support to terrorists. The statute provides that an
individual convicted of such action may face a sentence ranging from a fine
to life in prison.80 Subsection (b) of the statute defines the term as follows:
the term 'material support or resources' means any property tangible
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments
or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safe-houses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be
or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious
materials. 81
By providing specific examples of conduct that constitutes material
support, the statutory definition provides more insight into the type of
offense that may be punishable under the statute. However, as with most
statutory language, many ambiguities persist.
In order for statutes to be necessarily pliable and adaptive, "statutory
language can never be so precise as to eliminate the need for authoritative
interpretation." 82 However, in drafting legislation, Congress must find the
76 Id. at 261.
77 325 U.S. I (1945).
78 Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of
Treason's Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. T. TRANSNAT'L L. 1443, 1456 (2009).
79 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 765, 1256 (1I th ed. 2007).
80 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
81 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
82 Arthur S. Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 VA. L. REv. 23
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balance between allowing for growth and interpretation in statutory
language and the sort of vague open-endedness that is often deemed
unconstitutional. 83 Drafters are well aware of this balance, and their
decision to use imprecise language is often purposeful and deliberate. 84 By
leaving statutes inexact and pliable, Congress has effectively delegated a
great deal of discretion to the courts, leaving it to their prudence to shape
the laws within the bounds of the Constitution. 85
The courts have upheld challenges regarding the vagueness of the
"material support" language. In United States v. Sattar,86 the court stated
that anyone of ordinary intelligence could ascertain what conduct was
prohibited by [18 U.S.C. § 2339A] and the statute was laid out with
sufficient definiteness so that its enforcement was not left to arbitrary and
discriminatory choices of law enforcement officials.87 Additionally, in
United States v. Awan, 88 the court found that § 2339A(b)(1)'s definition of
material support was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the
defendant. In that instance, the defendant was charged with providing funds
and recruits to further a conspiracy to commit violence. The court stated
that anyone of ordinary intelligence would have understood defendant's
alleged activities to be illegal. 89
It is essential to point out that the above cases represent challenges by
defendants charged with crimes proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. The
substantive language of that section provides a scienter requirement, and
only criminalizes provisions of material support "knowing or intending that
[such support] be used in preparation for, or in carrying out" certain
crimes.90 However, the plain language of § 2339A(b) defining material
(1956).
83 James C. Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law, 3
VAND. L. REV. 531, 541-42 (1950). Indefinite statutes are invalid on the basis that an individual does
not have sufficient warning. Pursuant to Amendments V and VI of the Constitution, an individual
accused of a crime shall receive due process of law and shall be adequately informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Furthermore, if a standard is not definite enough to guide a judge and jury, the
statute is effectively meaningless.
84 Miller, supra note 82, at 24; contra Quarles, supra note 83 ("The language of these legislatures
usually lacks mathematical precision. This imprecision is in part due to poor draftsmanship, but is
primarily due to the innate frailties of human language.").
85 Miller, supra note 82, at 23-24; see also GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS;
STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Cambridge University Press
2003).
86 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
87 Id.
88 459 F. Supp. 2d 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
89 Id
90 Id. at 179.
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support,91 does not raise any element of intent or provide for a scienter
requirement. In Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales,92 plaintiff alleged
that because the prohibition on providing material support to terrorists
involves vicarious criminal liability without requiring proof of specific
intent, the statute violated the Fifth Amendment. 93 Plaintiff urged the court
to read a specific intent mens rea requirement into the definition, but the
court declined, stating that such a requirement would be contrary to
congressional intent.94
In light of the courts' conclusions regarding the intent requirement of
§ 2339A(b)'s definition of material support,95 it is evident that the language
may result in unjust applications. In 2010, the Supreme Court released their
opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,96 concluding that the
"knowing" requirement cannot be evaluated to consider the defendant's
intentions in providing such material support.97 Therefore, individuals who
seek to assist oppressed victims of foreign terrorist organizations, or to
facilitate any lawful, nonviolent purposes of these organizations, may be
convicted under applicable anti-terrorism laws.98
The Court's decision in Holder, which categorized humanitarian aid as
material support for terrorism, demonstrates one point along the broad
spectrum of instances in which courts have found material support.99 The
case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former driver,
demonstrates an overt and egregious instance of supporting terrorism.100
There is little doubt that acting as a driver and personal bodyguard to
91 See supra pp. 10-11.
92 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal 2005), affd, 509 F. 3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007).
93 Id. at 1142.
94 Id at 1145-46. (Congress unambiguously and purposefully failed to provide an intent
requirement in § 2339A(b). By providing a "knowing or intending" requirement in § 2339A(a), it can
be ascertained that Congress acted deliberately in excluding such an intent requirement in § 2339A(b)).
95 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2708 (2010) ("Over the years, § 2339B
and the definition of 'material support or resources' have been amended, inter alia, to clarify that a
violation requires knowledge of the foreign group's designation as a terrorist organization or its
commission of terrorist acts.").
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2708-09 ("That reading is inconsistent with § 2339B's text, which prohibits 'knowingly'
providing material support and demonstrates that Congress chose knowledge about the organization's
connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further its terrorist activities ....
98 Id. at 2712
99 Id.
100 After 5 Years at Gitmo, Alleged Bin Laden Aide Charged, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 11,
2007, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/politics/4794735.html; Robert F. Worth, Bin
Laden Driver to Be Sent to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l1/26/washington/26gitmo.html? r=0. Haman was charged with
conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism in 2007 while being detained at Guantanamo
Bay. The charges were later dropped on jurisdictional grounds when Haman was deemed an illegal
enemy combatant and therefore subjected to a military tribunal.
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Osama bin Laden, as well as transporting and delivering weapons to al-
Qaeda, constitutes material support for terrorism.101 Such blatantly illegal
actions stand in sharp contrast to those of Hawo Mohamed Hassan, the 63-
year-old Minnesota woman who went door-to-door in her community to
collect donations for humanitarian aid for the people of Somalia.102 Yet
given the application of the term "material support," these actions are equal
in the eyes of the law.
III. THE TERRORIST EXPATRIATION ACT: AN UNJUST AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSITION
A. The Legislation: Background and Troubling Repercussions
Proposed bill H.R. 5237 seeks to bring the existing federal expatriation
law up to date by including provisions applicable to the current war on
terror. 103 As Senator Lieberman stated, the current war on terror involves
"fighting an enemy who doesn't wear the uniform of a conventional army
or follow the law of war."104 Furthermore, these enemies are often
domestic- United States citizens, living among us and enjoying the rights
and privileges of citizenship, all while plotting against the very nation they
claim to be a part of. Congressman Charlie Dent, a co-sponsor of the bill,
said "[b]eing an American citizen is more than a right, it is a responsibility.
When individuals. . . take actions that are proven threats against our nation
- they violate that responsibility." 0 5
In its current form, the proposed Terrorist Expatriation Actl06 adds an
eighth section to the list of expatriating acts currently proscribed by 8
U.S.C. § 1481. Proposed subsection 8 states that a person may lose their
United State nationality for:
(A) providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization; (B) engaging in, or purposefully and materially
supporting hostilities against the United States; or (C) engaging in,
or purposefully and materially supporting hostilities against any
country or armed force that is (i) directly engaged along with the
101 Id
102 Discussed supra, p. 1.
103 Press Release, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Terrorist Expatriation Act Summary, May 6, 2010,
available at http://Iieberman.senate.gov/index.cfin/news-events/news/2010/5/lieberman-brown-altmire-
dent-introduce-terrorist-expatriation-act.
104 Id
105 Id.
106 Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237, 11 lh Cong. (2010).
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United States in hostilities engaged in by the United States or (ii)
providing direct operational support to the United States in
hostilities engaged in by the United States. 0 7
This clause, like the preceding seven, fall under § 1481(a), which states
that such loss shall occur upon "voluntarily performing any of the
following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality"
(emphasis added).08 Furthermore, the proposed amendment includes the
addition of subsection (c) which states that the definition of material
support found in 18 U.S.C. § 2399A will be applicable to the proposed
subsection. 109
An individual found to have committed one of the expatriating acts listed
in the statute, including that of proposed subsection (8), would be subject to
an administrative determination by the State Department that the individual
has lost his or her nationality.110 These determinations fall outside the
realm of formal court proceedings and therefore do not guarantee that an
individual will receive the constitutional protections of due process. The
Court has long held that expatriation statutes are not penal in nature and
therefore the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to punish
are inapplicable."'I As the Supreme Court stated in Vance, "expatriation
proceedings are civil in nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty."ll 2
To say that stripping an individual of their citizenship does not constitute
a "loss of liberty"13 seems contrary to the inherent nature of citizenship
and liberty that the United States claims to protect so dearly. As Chief
Justice Warren stated, "man's basic right for [citizenship] is nothing less
than the right to have rights. Remove this priceless possession and there
remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his
countrymen."ll 4 Denationalized individuals are no longer a member of any
107 Id. at § 2.
108 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a).
109 H.R. 5237, 11lt' Cong. § (c)(3).
110 Lieberman, supra note 103.
Ill Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-96 (1958). In considering the constitutionality of Section4 01(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, the Court looked at the purpose of the statute when deciding on
its penal nature. "If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment -- that is, to
reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc. -- it has been considered penal. But a statute has been
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate
governmental purpose." When a statute contains aspects of both of these elements, the intention of the
legislature will prevail. In Trop, the Court held that the statute in question was penal and therefore
unconstitutional, as the sole purpose of the statute was to inflict punishment; there was no element of
foreign policy control involved in the statute.
112 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 266 (1980).
113 Id.
114 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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organized community and therefore not afforded the rights and protections
associated with such membership, and effectively have no right to stay
anywhere on the face of the earth."t5 Furthermore, every sovereign nation
has the right to expel aliens from their borders, often in a discriminatory
and arbitrary fashion.116 As a stateless being, such alien would have no
avenue of recourse, and no legal standing for a sovereign or international
organization to intervene on his or her behalf.117
American citizenship is regarded as "one of the most valuable rights in
the world."" 8 Americans who have been stripped of their citizenship lose
their basic political and economic rights, including the right to practice
their profession, vote, hold public office and countless others. 119 In many
of the leading cases brought before the Supreme Court, the individuals
weren't even aware of their expatriated status until they encountered
trouble securing a passport or registering to vote.120 Often, by the time an
individual becomes aware of his or her expatriated status, significant time
has elapsed since the administrative decision was made. Although the
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of expatriation
proceedingS,121 the lack of notice regarding such decisions is alarming and
unjust. Furthermore, because expatriation statues are deemed to be non-
penal in nature,122 there is no requirement that the basis for an individual's
denaturalization be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.123 Rather, it
is the individual who must rebut the presumption that their denouncement
115 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1190.
116 Id. at 1190-91.
117 Id.at1191.
118 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 235
(1953).
119 Pollak, supra note 21, at 1189; Brad K. Blitz, REFUGEE STUDIES CENTER, STATELESSNESS,
PROTECTION AND EQUALITY 1 (2009) ("While stateless people enjoy human rights under international
law they often face barriers that prevent them from accessing their rights. These include the right to
establish a legal residence, travel, work in the formal economy, send children to school, access basic
health services, purchase or own property, vote, hold elected office, and enjoy the protection and
security of a country.").
120 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see also Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 305 (1915).
121 See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
122 See supra text accompanying note 111.
123 Vance, 444 U.S. at 260, 260, 268 ("It is enough ... to establish one of the expatriating acts
specified in [8 U.S.C.] § 1481(a) because Congress has declared each of those acts to be inherently
inconsistent with the retention of citizenship. . . . It is difficult to understand that 'assent' to loss of
citizenship would mean anything less than an intent to relinquish citizenship, whether the intent is
expressed in words or is found as a fair inference from proved conduct. . . . Section 1481(c) provides
that any of the statutory expatriation acts, if proved, are presumed to have been committed voluntarily.
It does not also direct a presumption that the act has been performed with the intent to relinquish United
States citizenship. That matter remains the burden of the party claiming expatriation to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence.").
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of citizenship was voluntary, by a preponderance of the evidence.124
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has long upheld the
constitutionality of both the nature of expatriation statutes and the
procedures for their implementation, the questions regarding the fairness
and justice served by these measures are without resolution.
B. Applying Precedent to the Terrorist Expatriation Act
For over a century, the Supreme Court has looked at two main questions
surrounding expatriation statutes. First, the question of whether such
statutes themselves are constitutional. As discussed above, citizenship is a
natural and inherent right, which cannot be divested without the assent of
the individual.125  Furthermore, Congress does not have a right to
involuntarily strip an individual of his or her citizenship under the guise of
sovereignty or immigration and naturalization powers.126 Rather, a citizen
must voluntarily relinquish such citizenship, either expressly or implicitly
through certain actions. 127 As applied to the proposed Terrorist
Expatriation Act,128 the addition of subsection (8) would fall under
§ 1481(a), which provides that any action for which citizenship shall be
revoked, must be performed voluntarily and with the express intention of
relinquishing United States nationality.129
On its face, the proposed amendment retains the requirement that any
renouncement of citizenship must be voluntary and intentional. However,
when combining this requirement with the Court's historically broad and
loose interpretation of the term "material support," 30 lots of holes for
possible injustices become apparent. Consider again, Hawo Mohamed
Hassan, the 63-year-old Minnesota woman soliciting donations for war torn
Somalia. It appears that, given the Court's sweeping application of
"material support," this woman would be convicted of providing material
support to a terrorist organization.131 So then, does it necessarily follow
that she made such voluntary collections with the intention of relinquishing
124 Id. at 267 ("[T]he preponderance standard of proof provides sufficient protection for the interest
of the individual in retaining his citizenship.").
125 See supra Part 1.
126 Id.
127 Vance, 444 U.S. at 261-62 ("Voluntary relinquishment is 'not confined to a written
renunciation,' but 'can also be manifested by other actions declared expatriative under the [A]ct, if such
actions are in derogation of allegiance to this country."). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a).
128 Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237, 111th Cong. (2010).
129 § 1481(a).
130 See supra Part II.
131 See supra p. 13; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010).
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her United States nationality? Most likely not, but the Court has taken the
actions listed in § 148 1(a) as prima facie evidence of such intention. 132
Looking at the historical evidence as well as the original intentions and
evolution of expatriation statutes, it is simply incongruent to say that by
collecting aid for a terrorist ravaged nation, Ms. Hassan is exercising her
"natural and inherent right" to expatriate herself from the United States. 133
To better ascertain Congress's intent behind the proposed legislation, it
is significant to look at the second problem expatriation statutes often
involve - due process. As noted above, subsection (7) of the current
expatriation statutel 34 is the only provision that requires conviction.
Treason, as discussed in that section, is a criminal offense, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2385. As a criminal statute, any individual charged under this
offense must be afforded the constitutional protections of due process
before any punishment can be imposed. It is only after such processes have
been implemented and the defendant has been convicted that 8 U.S.C. §
1481(a)(7) becomes applicable and the defendant may face
denationalization.
Due process and conviction are constitutionally required before a
criminal offense may be punished. Although such procedures are not
constitutionally required for the "nonpenal" "civil proceedings"
surrounding expatriation, formal conviction of the underlying offense
eliminates some of the ambiguities and injustices inherent in § 1481(a).
Presumably, upon conviction, questions regarding the intention and
voluntariness of the underlying action will have been resolved at trial. At
that point, there is little or no doubt, that an individual convicted of
treasonl 35 acted voluntarily and intentionally in a manner inconsistent with
an intention to retain one's identity as a United States citizen.
Despite the fact that the conviction of the underlying offense may
eliminate some injustices in the expatriation statute, it is not required of
subsections (a)(1)-(a)(6), as those actions are not criminal offenses.
However, proposed subsection (8) is. Providing materials support to a
terrorist organization is a criminal offense, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
The imposition of any punishment for such action, without due process and
conviction, is unconstitutional and invalid.
132 Vance, 444 U.S. at 469 ("It is enough ... to establish one of the expatriating acts specified in §
1481(a) because Congress has declared each of those acts to be inherently inconsistent with the
retention of citizenship.").
133 See supra p. 1, 4.
134 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7).
135 Id
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IV. TREASON AND TERRORISM
As noted above,136 treason has a long history of strict punishment in the
United States. Historically, during times of conventional war, an individual
aiding the enemy by providing information, support or other resources
would be subject to prosecution for treason. In the 1940's and 50's when
the statute was enacted and amended, largely in its present form, the nation
was still ringing with fears from World War II and suspicion of the future
of the communist movement. However, in the twenty-first century,
questions of war and treason in the United States do not involve
conventional enemies. As noted by Senator Scott Brown in advocating for
the Terrorist Expatriation Act, "[i]t is critical to our homeland security that
we adjust and adapt our defense measures to keep terrorism out of our
country." 37
Constitutionally, the Treason Clause defines such an act as that of
"levying war against the United States."l 38 18 U.S.C. § 2385 discusses
treason in terms of advocating overthrow of Government.139 The very
nature of terrorists' missions, as evidenced by al-Qaeda, involves levying
war against the United States and all that it stands for. The September 1 1th
attackers assembled men and employed force against the United States
government for such purposes.140 The avowed purpose of attackers was to
alter the policies of the United States, rendering their conduct
treasonous. 141 In sentencing the 1993 World Trade Center bombers, an
appellate judge upheld a lower court's imposition of a treason sentencing
guideline, saying that defendant's actions were "tantamount to waging
war" against the United States.142
Today, a conviction for the crime of treason requires the finding of four
specific elements: 1) there must be an overt act; 2) two witnesses must
136 See supra p. 9.
137 Lieberman, supra note 103.
138 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
139 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006) ("Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or
teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of
the United States of the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the
government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence or by the assassination of any
officer of any such government; or . .. Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society,
group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any
such government by force or violence or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society,
group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof. . . .").
140 Carlton F. W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863, 913 (2006); Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou,
Responsibility, Injustice and the American Dilemma, 11 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 3, 7, n. 13 (2005).
141 Larson, supra note 140, at 913.
142 United States v. Rahman, 189 F. 3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 1999).
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testify to support the government's allegations regarding the overt act
executed by the individual that allegedly constituted treason; 3) the
individual must possess an intent to betray the United States, as evidenced
by the overt act, and 4) the overt act must have provided aid and comfort to
the enemy.143 Consider the actions of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin
Laden's driver. Surely his actions satisfy the four elements of treason.
What about the actions of Hawo Mohamed Hassan, collecting money for
the impoverished people of Somalia? It appears that her actions did not
evidence intent to betray the United States. Trying those individuals who
have allegedly provided material support to terrorists under the treason
statutes will ensure a more searching, and ultimately more just, inquiry.
As stated above, treason convictions have been rare since the World War
II era. 144 However, in 2006 the United States issued their first treason
indictment since that time, in the case of Adam Gadahn, a U.S. citizen who
appeared in several al-Qaeda propaganda videos. 145 The indictment alleges
that Gadahn, "owing allegiance to the United States, knowingly adhered to
an enemy of the United States, namely, al-Qaeda, and gave al-Qaeda aid
and comfort, within the United States and elsewhere, with intent to betray
the United States." 46 This indictment significantly recognizes the inherent
overlap in the prosecution of federal anti-terrorism statutes and treason.
By recognizing terrorism as the modern day incarnation of treason, the
proposed Terrorist Expatriation Act is redundant and unnecessary. In
addition to being constitutionally invalid, the proposed subsection merely
reiterates that which is already protected by subsection (7). In looking at
the future of both domestic and foreign policy, the United States must
recognize that modern day terrorists, in declaring holy wars and attacking
the very essence of America, are in fact, committing treason. Today's
world no longer involves Benedict Arnold, or Russian double agents.
Rather, treason today takes the form of Farooque Ahmed, Faisal Shahzad
and other domestic terrorists, living among us, levying war against the
United States and advocating for the overthrow of this nation.
143 Sperber, supra note 70, at 191-92; Henry Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea
to Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REv. 181, 189 (2002).
144 See supra, p. 12.
145 See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Adam Gadahn a.k.a. Azzam al-Amriki, SA
CR 05-254(A) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/adamindictment.pdf; Eichensehr, supra note 78, at 1458.
146 Eichensehr, supra note 78, at 1458.
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